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Case No. 20080979-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

HAROLD EARL BUSHMAN,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of securities fraud, a third
degree felony, and six counts of attempted securities fraud, all class A
misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A~4-103(2)(e)
(West Supp. 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the imposition in successive
proceedings of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Following
administrative proceedings on his violations of securities laws, the Utah Division of
Securities ordered that Defendant cease and desist and imposed a fine.
Issue: Was the fine a criminal punishment, thus precluding prosecution and
punishment for the violations in subsequent criminal proceedings?

Standard of review: " Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is,
at least initially, a matter of statutory construction/' See Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 99 (1997). It is also a "question of constitutional interpretation." State v.
Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270,1271 (Utah App. 1996). Issues of statutory construction and
constitutional interpretation are both legal questions, reviewable for correctness. See
Arbon, 909 P.2d at 1271; see also State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, Tf 7,

P.3d

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant statutes are included in the Addendum:
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (West 2004) (Enforcement);
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (West 2004) (Penalties for violations).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of having engaged in a
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1603 (West 2004); one count of securities fraud, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004); and ten counts of securities fraud,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (West 2004). Rl-5.
Defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the prosecution violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution because the Utah
Securities Division had previously issued a cease and desist order and an order to
show cause based on the same conduct and because, in resolving that administrative
case, Defendant and the Division had entered into a stipulation and consent order
2

.

requiring Defendant to pay a fine. See Rl03-11. The State opposed, arguing that the
fine was part of a civil remedy, not a punishment, and that Defendant had not been
placed in jeopardy during the administrative proceedings that resulted in the fine.
See R112-18, After hearing argument on the motion, the trial court denied it. See
R186-87; R232:14-16.
Defendant then entered a guilty plea, reserving his right to challenge the
denial of his motion to dismiss, R189-202. Defendant pled guilty to one count of
securities fraud, a third degree felony, and to six counts of attempted securities
fraud, all class A misdemeanors. Id. The State dismissed the remaining counts. See
id.
On October 20, 2008, the trial court entered judgment, imposing an
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years on Defendant's conviction for
securities fraud, but suspending the prison term and imposing a five-day jail term.
See R210. The court imposed one-year jail terms on Defendant's six convictions for
attempted securities fraud, to be served consecutively, but suspended all terms. See
id.} see also R234:9-ll. The court placed Defendant on probation for 204 months and
imposed a fine of $5000 on Defendant's felony conviction and fines of $2500 on each
of Defendant's misdemeanor convictions, but apparently suspended all but $1100 in
fines, including surcharges. R234:9-10; R207-11.

3

On November 20, 2008, Defendant filed both a notice of appeal, R216, and a
motion to extend for good cause the time for appeal, R217. The trial court granted
the motion to extend. R220. Defendant's appeal is therefore timely. See Utah R.
App. P. 4(e) (trial court "may extend time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by [rule 4(a),
i.e., within 30 days after the date of the entry of the judgment]").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged for conduct involving his solicitation of investments
and loans from several individuals.
Dealings with Darold Jensen. In approximately September 2002, Defendant
met Darold Jensen. R230:5-7. Defendant told Jensen that he had just sold 50,000
shares of Sun Micro stock for $5.26 a share and would receive the proceeds in about
two months. R230:6. Defendant asked Jensen for a $30,000 loan, stated he would
repay him before January 6,2003, and offered to pay 20 percent interest on the loan.
R230:6-8. The parties signed a written agreement, and Jensen gave Defendant the
$30,000.

R230:8-9 (referencing State's Exhibit 1).

Jensen called Defendant

approximately one year later, asking for his money. R230:9. Five years later, at the
time of the preliminary hearing, Jensen still had received nothing. R230:9-10.
Transactions with Jeff Jermaine. In March 2005, Defendant asked Jeff
Jermaine for a $5000 loan to pay for some family expenses. R230:14. On March 21,
4

2005, Defendant gave Jermaine a promissory note, promising to repay the $5000
loan with 10 percent interest on July 1, 2005. R230:14-15, 19 (referencing State's
Exhibit 3). Defendant told Jermaine that he was expecting a judgment or settlement
in a medical malpractice action from which he would make the repayment. R230:15.
On May 6, 2005, Defendant asked Jermaine for additional funds. R230:15-16.
Jermaine lent him an addition $1800, to be repaid on May 11, 2005. R230:16-17.
Defendant paid back the principal on the loans about a year later. R230:18.
Defendant did not make any interest payments. R230:19.
Dealings with Randy Porter, On approximately March 7,2006, Randy Porter
lent Defendant between $250 and $750. R230:21-22. Defendant said he needed the
money to purchase a gift for his wife. R230:21-22. Defendant repaid this loan on a
timely basis. R230:22.
A few weeks later, Defendant called Porter. R230:23. He told Porter that
Oracle was giving him $80,000 in stock options for his consulting services that year.
Id. Defendant said that because he was a consultant, he received the options for
about 15 percent below market value, but could exercise them the same day for a 15
percent gain. R230:23-24. Defendant said he was "only going to be able to do about
[$]70,000." R230:24. Defendant told Porter that if he wanted to put in $2500 or
$3000, Defendant could get him a 15 percent return in a month and a half. R230:24.
Defendant said that "the whole process would take about a month and a half
5

because it had to clear and everything/' Id. Defendant also agreed to pay the taxes
and give Porter the cash. Id. Porter invested $3000 in mid-May 2006. R230:29.
Porter invested money with Defendant three other times. R230:29.

He

invested $2500 with Defendant to buy silicone chips from one company and sell
them to another. R230:30. In approximately June 2006, Defendant called Porter to
tell him that his money was ready, but asked if Porter would like to roll it over and
also invest another $2500. Id. Porter invested again. Id. Defendant then called
asking for another $5000, but Porter could only come up with $1000. R230:32.
Porter was uncertain about these individual amounts, but testified that he paid out a
total of about $12,000. R230:42.
Defendant repaid the money, with the interest, in approximately September
2006. R230:34.
Dealings with Steven Sandstrom.

Defendant originally asked Steven

Sandstrom to invest in truck parts, stuck in customs in Mexico, that, when released,
would generate a large profit. R230:45. Sandstrom gave Defendant a check for
$2500, but then stopped payment on the check. Id.
In the fall of 2006, Defendant approached Sandstrom, saying that he had
previously worked for Sun Microsystems and had some very favorable stock
options, but was short on money to exercise them. R230:46. Defendant asked for
$3000, which he promised to return with $240 in interest in two weeks. R230:47.
6

Sandstrom gave him the $3000. Id. A month later, Defendant asked for more
money, saying that something had happened with the options. Id. Sandstrom
wrote Defendant a check for $4000. R230:48. When he did not repay the money,
Defendant gave Sandstrom a document stating that Defendant owed him $7,700,
plus a late penalty, for a total of $9000. R230:49. A year and a half later, after
Sandstrom"s lawyer wrote Defendant telling him that he would contact the Attorney
General's Office unless he repaid the money, Sandstrom received $7,700, but no
additional interest or late payment fee. R230:50.
Dealings with Floyd Richey. Floyd Richey testified that Defendant first
approached him about an investment in the early 2000's. R230:54. The investment
offer "was about the microchips out of Ireland or somewhere/' Id. Richey did not
invest at that time. Id. In late 2006 or 2007, Defendant again approached Richey first
with a chip deal and then with a high-interest cash deal, but Richey declined both
offers. R230:55-56.
Investigation by Susan Jones. Susan Jones, an investigator with the Utah
Division of Securities, investigated Defendant's transactions with the investors.
R230:58. She testified that while Defendant told some investors that he had stock
options in Intel and Sun Microsystems, affidavits from those companies stated they
had no records of those options. R230:59-60. She also testified that while Defendant
told some investors that he would repay them with the proceeds from a pending
7

medical malpractice suit, he did not tell them that the proceeds from that action, if
any, were already committed. R230:59.
Jones noted that some of the transactions involved promissory notes. R230:58.
She testified that non-collateralized promissory notes are presumed to be securities,
which should have been registered, but were not. R230:58-59, 62, 65. She also
testified that Defendant was not licensed to sell securities, but failed to tell the
investors that he was not licensed. R230:61-62.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The fine imposed by the Division of Securities was a civil sanction. A
sanction is civil if the legislature intends that it be civil and if the effects of the
sanction are not so punitive as to render it criminally punitive in the double
jeopardy context. Only the "clearest proof" suffices to show that a sanction
intended by the legislature to be civil is criminally punitive.
Here, the legislature, by giving an administrative agency authority to impose
a fine, indicated its intent that the sanction be civil. For the following reasons, the
effects of the fine were not so punitive as to transform it into a criminal penalty:
(1) monetary penalties have not historically been viewed as punishment; (2) a fine
does not impose any affirmative disability or restraint comparable to imprisonment;
(3) the fine comes into play without regard to a finding of scienter; (4) while the
conduct for which the fine was imposed may also be criminal, that fact does not
8

render the fine criminally punitive; and (5) while the fine may deter others from
similar conduct, deterrence may serve civil, as well as criminal, goals.
Because the fine here was a civil sanction, Defendant's subsequent criminal
punishment for securities violations was not a successive criminal punishment and
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE FINE IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION OF
SECURITIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WAS A
CIVIL SANCTION, IT DID NOT BAR PROSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF DEFENDANT IN SUBSEQUENT CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
Defendant claims that his "conviction should be reversed because [the]
prosecution was barred in this matter based on double jeopardy/' Br. Appellant at
10 (boldface and capitalization omitted). He raises his claim under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 10-16. He asserts that the fine
imposed in his administrative case was "not solely civil in nature/' that it was a
criminal penalty, and that the State was therefore "precluded by Double Jeopardy
from once again pursuing criminal charges and penalties."

Id. at 13-14

(capitalization and underlining omitted). He further argues that "even if the
legislature intended the remedy to be civil, it is punitive and triggers the protections
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 14 (boldface, capitalization, and underlining

9

omitted). However, under controlling law, the administrative fine was a civil
penalty. Therefore, Defendant cannot prevail on his double jeopardy claim.
Relevant law. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no "person [shall]
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." In
Hudson v. United States, 511 U.S. 93 (1997), the United States Supreme Court noted
that it has "long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the
imposition of all additional sanctions that could, '"in common parlance,"' be
described as punishment." Id. at 98-99 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
317 U.S. 537,549 (1943), in turn quoting Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13,19,14 L.Ed. 306
(1852)). Rather, "[t]he Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense," id. at 99 (citing Helvering v. Mitcltell, 303
U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (additional citations omitted) (emphasis in Hudson), and "then
only when such occurs in successive proceedings," id. (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 366 (1983)).
Hudson is the most recent United States Supreme Court case to focus on the
double jeopardy implications of administrative sanctions and is controlling law in
this case.

The Hudson Court addressed monetary penalties and occupational

debarment imposed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) on bank
officers for violating banking laws. See 522 U.S. at 93. In so doing, the Court
outlined a two-prong test for determining "[wjhether a particular punishment is
10

criminal or civil." Id. at 99. First, a court must "ask whether the legislature, 'in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other/" Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242,248 (1980)). Then," [e]ven in those cases where the legislature 'has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty/" (quoting Ward, 588 U.S. at 248-49), a court
must also ask, "'whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect' as to 'transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty/" id. (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,154 (1956)).l
The Court further observed, "In making this latter determination, the factors
listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,168-169 ... (1963), provide useful
guideposts." Id. Those factors include: "(1) '[wjhether the sanction involves an

1

Hudson followed United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), which in turn
followed Ward, 448 U.S. at 242. The Hudson court held "that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a bar to the later criminal prosecution because
the [prior] administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal." 522 U.S. at 95-96.
But the Court stated that in so doing, it disavowed in large part "the method of
analysis used in [Halper] and reaffirmed] the previously established rule
exemplified in [Ward].f/ Id. at 96.
Citation to Halper and authority relying on Halper should therefore be viewed
with caution. State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270 (Utah App. 1996), and State v. Mendoza,
938 P.2d 303 (Utah App. 1997), referenced by Defendant in his brief, were decided
when Halper was controlling authority, and therefore employ an analysis that is no
longer wholly viable.
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affirmative disability or restraint'; (2) 'whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment'; (3) 'whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter';
(4) 'whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence'; (5) 'whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime'; (6) 'whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it'; and (7) 'whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned/" Id. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
But, the Court cautioned, "It is important to note ... that 'these factors must be
considered in relation to the statute on its face/" id. at 100 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S.
at 169), and "'only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," id.
(citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249) (additional quotation marks omitted).
The Hudson Court held that the monetary penalties and occupational
debarment imposed by the OCC were civil sanctions. 522 U.S. at 105. The Court
therefore concluded that criminal prosecution and punishment of the bank officers
would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing a successive criminal
punishment. Id.
In reaching this result, the Court first concluded, "It is evident that Congress
intended the OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed for violations
of [relevant United States code sections] to be civil in nature." Id. at 103. The Court
12

reasoned that "[w]hile the provision authorizing debarment contains no language
explicitly denominating the sanction as civil/7 it is "significant that the authority to
issue debarment orders is conferred upon the appropriate Federal banking
agenc[ies].77 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in
Hudson). The Court stated, "That such authority was conferred upon administrative
agencies is prima facie evidence that Congress intended to provide for a civil
sanction/' Id.
Turning to the second prong of the test, i.e., whether the effects of the money
penalties or debarment sanctions were "so punitive in form and effect as to render
them criminal despite Congress 7 intent to the contrary/ 7 the Court found "little
evidence, much less the clearest proof that we require/ 7 id. at 104, to "override
Congress 7 intent and transform what had been denominated a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty/ 7 id. at 100 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
The Court explained: "First, neither money penalties nor debarment has
historically been viewed as punishment/ 7

Id. at 104. "Second, the sanctions

imposed do not involve an 'affirmative disability or restraint777 — "certainly nothing
approaching the 'infamous punishment 7 of imprisonment.77 Id. at 104 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "Third, neither sanction comes into play
'only 7 on a finding of scienter/ 7 that is, money penalties are allowable "without
regard to the violator's state of mind.77 Id. Fourth, while the conduct for which the
13

OCC sanctions are imposed may also be criminal, that fact "is insufficient to render
the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally punitive/7 Id. at 105.
Finally, although the Court recognized that the imposition of monetary penalties
and debarment sanctions would deter others from similar conduct— "a traditional
goal of criminal punishment," the Court nevertheless concluded that "the mere
presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence
'may serve civil as well as criminal goals/" Id. (internal citations omitted).
"In sum," the Court held, "there simply is very little showing, to say nothing
of the 'clearest proof required ... that OCC money penalties and debarment
sanctions are criminal." Id. As a result, the Double Jeopardy Clause constituted "no
obstacle to [the bank officers'] trial on the pending indictments." Id.
Analysis. Here, the sanctions imposed and their attendant circumstances are
very similar to those in Hudson. The Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann.

14

§§ 61-1-1 to -30, establishes civil proceedings and sanctions for securities violations
and also defines criminal offenses based on such violations.2
Section 61-1-20 provides that "[w]henever it appears to the director [of the
Division of Securities] that any person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to
engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or any rule or
order under this chapter, in addition to any specific powers granted in this chapter
... the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the division
and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the person to cease
and desist/' Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (West 2004). It also provides that "after a
hearing, the director may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in any
act or practice constituting a violation/7 "impose a fine," or suspend that person
from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this state."
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-20(l)(e), (f), & (g).

2

Section 61-1-20 ("Enforcement") governs administrative proceedings and
sanctions; section 61-1-21 ("Penalties for violations") defines criminal offenses. The
separate provisions are similar to those in Hudson where Congress provided for civil
proceedings and penalties for violations of banking laws in one title of the United
States Code and defined criminal violations for violations of those laws in another.
See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96-97.

15

The legislature's authorization of administratively imposed sanctions
demonstrates that those sanctions are civil in nature. As Hudson held, "That such
authority was conferred upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that
[the Utah legislature] intended to provide for a civil sanction." 522 U.S. at 103.
Thus, the legislature, "in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either
expressly or impliedly a preference" that a civil label be applied to the sanctions
imposed by the Division of Securities. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This satisfies the first prong of the Hudson test.
The legislative scheme also meets the second prong of the Hudson test. The
same factors that demonstrated that the administrative sanctions in Hudson were not
so punitive in form and effect as to render those sanctions criminal are present in
this case. First, as explained, the sanction here was a fine — a monetary penalty. As
explained in Hudson, monetary penalties have not "historically been viewed as
sanctions." Id. at 104. Second, neither the cease and desist order nor the fine
imposed "an affirmative disability or restraint," "certainly nothing approaching the
'infamous punishment' of imprisonment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Third, the administratively-imposed sanction did not "come[] into play
'only' on a finding of scienter," that is, the fine was allowable "without regard to the
violator's state of mind." Id. at 104; see also Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20. By contrast,
the statute defining criminal offenses for securities violations requires a "willful"
16

a n d / o r "knowing" mental state. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21. Fourth, while the
conduct for which the Securities Division sanctions are imposed may also be
criminal, as was the conduct in Hudson, that fact "is insufficient to render the money
penalt[y] ... criminally punitive/' Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105. Finally, while the fine
imposed here may deter others from similar conduct— a traditional goal of criminal
punishment—" the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction
criminal, as deterrence 'may serve civil as well as criminal goals/" Id. (internal
citations omitted).
The two other Kennedy factors mentioned, but not discussed at length in
Hudson, also support a conclusion that the fine here was more remedial than
punitive. First, the $19,300 fine imposed was reducible "dollar for dollar for any
money paid to the victims" within twelve days of the Division's order. R249.
Moreover, if Defendant paid the full amount to the victims by that date, half of the
remaining $5000 fine was waived. Id. Thus, there was "an alternative purpose to
which [the fine] may rationally [have] be[en] connected," i.e., encouraging
Defendant's repaying his victims in a timely manner.

Hudson at 99 (quoting

Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the fine was
not "excessive in relation to the alternative purpose." Id. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy,
372 U.S. at 169) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

17

In sum, here, as in Hudson, application of the Kennedy factors demonstrates
that the statutory scheme was not "so punitive either in purpose or effect" as to
transform what the legislature "intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty/7
Id. at 99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under controlling law, the
sanctions imposed by the Division of Securities are thus civil sanctions, and the
punishment imposed on Defendant following his criminal conviction was not a
successive criminal punishment and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted October <x£ , 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JEANNRB. INOUYE

yssistamt Attorney General
iounsal for Appellee
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Addendum

Addendum

statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated.
(c) The division may publish information concerning any violation of this
chapter or the violation of any rule or order hereunder.
(2) For the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under this chapter,
the division or any employee designated by it may:
(a) administer oaths and affirmations;
(b) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance;
(c) take evidence; and
(d) require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, agreements, or other documents or records relevant or material to the
investigation.
Laws 1963, c 145, § 1, Laws 1979, c. 218, § 6; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 28; Laws 1990, c.
133, § 12
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 407 of the Uniform
Secunties Act (1956) See Volume 7C Uniform

Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw

Cross References
Perjury, falsification m official matters, see § 76-8-501 et seq
Library References
Securities Regulation C=»274
Westlaw Key Number Search 349Bk274.
C J S Securities Regulation §§ 413, 415

§ 61—1-20.

Enforcement

Whenever it appears to the director that any person has engaged, is engaging,
or is about to engage m any act or practice constituting a violation of this
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, in addition to any specific
powers granted in this chapter:
(l)(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before
the division and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the
person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or doing any
act in furtherance of the activity;
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the
date of the hearing;
(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order io show cause
upon each person named in the order;
(d) the director shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause uo sooner
than ten business days after the order is issued;
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(e) after a hearing, the director may issue an order to cease and desi c t
from engaging in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter
or any rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be accompanied by
written findings of fact and conclusions of law;
(f) the director may impose a fine; and
(g) the director may bar or suspend that person from associating with a
licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser m this state.
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of
this state or the appropriate court of another state to enjoin the acts or
practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order
under this chapter;
(b) upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the
court may:
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction;
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;
(lii) enter a declaratory judgment;
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets;
(v) order disgorgement;
(vi) order rescission;
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation of the act;
and
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers just; and
(c) the court may not require the division to post a bond in an action
brought under this subsection.
Laws 1963, c 145, § 1; Laws 1983, c 284, § 29, Laws 1986, c 107, § 1, Laws 1990, c.
133, § 13, Laws 1994, c. 12, § 70.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 408 of the Uniform
Securities Act (1956) See Volume 7C Uniform

Laws Annotated, Master Edition or ULA Database on Westlaw

Cross References
Complaint for declaratory judgment, see Rules Ci\ Proc , Form 8
Complaint foi injunctive iebef see Rules Civ P r o c , Form 9
Declaratory judgments generally, see § 78-33-1 et seq
Declaratory judgments, see Rules Civ Pioc , Rule 57
Extraordinary writs, judicial code, see § 78-35-1 et seq
Mandamus and prohibition, see § 78-35-9
Receivers see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 66

Westlaw Key Number Searches
349BL277, 349BL291

349Bk274,

415 to 416, 418, 428 to 429.

N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
Review

1

1

Review
'Upon determining that firm had unlawfully
distributed shares of stock without registration,
Utah Securities Advisory Board was authorized
to suspend all secondary trading exemptions of
stock involved, B o a r d s citation of technically

§ 61 — 1 - 2 1 .

inapplicable statute when it issued suspension
order was harmless error m that order was
nevertheless statutorily authorized.
U C A.
1953, 61-1-7, 61-1-20 Capital General Corp.
v Ulah
Dept o f Business Regulation, Securities
Div., 1989, 777 P 2d 494, certiorari denied 781
P 2d 878 Administrative Law And Procedure
o=»764 1, Securities Regulation @» 277

Penalties for violations

(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or wrho willfully
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section
61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material
respect.
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 6 1 - 1 - 1 :
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be
obtained was worth less than $10,000;
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained wTas worth $10,000 or more;
or
(ii)(A) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or
thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than
$10,000; and
(B) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted
any money representing:
(I) equity in a person's home;
(II) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
(III) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in
the Internal Revenue Code; 1 or
(c) is guilty of a second degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not less than three years or more than 15 years if:
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing
unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more;
and
di) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted
any money representing:
(A) equity in a person's home;
(B) a withdrawal from any individual retirement account; or
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Note 3

(C) a withdrawal from any qualified retirement plan as defined in the
Internal Revenue Code.
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he
proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order.
(4) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter,
the sentencing judge may impose any penalty or remedy provided for in
Subsection 61-1-20(2)(b).
Laws 1963, c 145, § 1; Laws 1971, c 155, § 1; Laws 1983, c 284, § 30; Laws 1990, c
133, § H, Laws 1991, c 161, § 12; Laws 1992, c. 216, § 4, Laws 1997, c. 160, § 10,
eff May 5, 1997; Laws 2001, c. 149, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001.
i See 26 U S C A § 1 et seq
Historical a n d Statutory N o t e s
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 409 of the Uniform
Securities Act (1956) See Volume 7C Uniform

Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw

Cross References
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felom, see § 76-3-301.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203
Right to trial by jur>, see Const Art 1, § 10.
Library References
Securities Regulation @»321.
Westlaw Key Number Search. 349Bk321.
C J S Securities Regulation §§ 445 to 446
N o t e s of D e c i s i o n s
Construction and application
Expert testimony 3
Jury instructions 4
Limitation of actions 2

1

1. Construction and application
Statute requiring that individual act "willfully" to be criminally liable for securities fraud
does not require "scienter," the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud
UCA1953,
61-1-1(2), 61-1-21 State v Larsen, 1993, 865
P 2d 1355 Securities Regulation C=> 323
2.

Limitation of actions
Five-year statute of limitations set forth m
Securities Act applied to defendant s crimmal
prosecution for securities fraud, rather than
four-year general felony limitation period
U C A 1953,^61-1-21, 76-1-103(1), 76-1-302(1)

3.

Expert testimony
Securities expert s use of word "material"
during testimony was not improper instruction
to jury on law m securities fraud prosecution;
although statute under which defendant was
prosecuted required finding that information
not disclosed was ' m a t e r i a l , " testimony when
read m context seemed to use word 'material"
as s\nonym for " i m p o r t a n t " U C.A 1953,
61-1-1(2)," 61-1-21, Rules of Evid , Rule 702
State v Larsen, 1993, 865 P 2d 1355 Criminal
Law 0=> 469 3
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that expert testimony m securities
fraud prosecution would be helpful to jury,
where expert expressed opinion that some of
material that defendant had omitted from securities documents could have been important or
significant to investor, technical n a t u r e of securities was not within knowledge of average lay-

